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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ownership and control of most large firms are generally separate
functions with many directors or managers (acting as agents) making
the financial decisions for the owners (the stockholders)., Since social
costs may arise from this separation of ownership and control, devising
a contract which minimizes these potential social costs is important.2
George Dent, in an article which seeks to rejuvenate the debate over
the separation of ownership and control, points out that "[m]ost observers . . .concede that the separation of ownership and control leads
to economic inefficiency and mistreatment of shareholders. 3 For exam-

* Deborah Gunthorpe, Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Tennessee. B.A., 1985,
University of South Florida; Ph.D., 1990, University of Florida.
** Haim Levy, Professor of Finance, Hebrew University and the University of Florida.
B.A., 1963, Hebrew University; M.A., 1966, Hebrew University; Ph.D., 1969, Hebrew University.
1. For more details of the ownership and management of the firm, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL,
BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUES AND GROWTH 27-32 (1959) and Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
2. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403-1444 (1985) (in particular the discussion of the principal-agent relationship beginning on page 1427).
3. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881 (1989).
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ple, when directors incorrectly reject a profitable project the loss of
wealth to the economy is called social costs (or equivalently agency
costs). Similarly, if directors decide to undertake a project characterized by the creation of negative net wealth, social costs are incur4
red.
This article analyzes possible social costs under alternative widespread compensation schemes in a multi-period context, as well as the
general compensation problem and implications for public officials,
managers, and other individuals. The article focuses on two areas: 1)
the willingness of agents to take profitable but risky projects, and 2)
the social costs arising from conflicts of interest between agents and
principals. The goal of this article is to present a compensation formula
that eliminates or minimizes these social costs. 5 In discussing these
costs, the article distinguishes between "indirect" agency costs, which
are defined as a reduction in the value of the firm due to errors made
by the agent in the investment decision process, and "direct" agency
costs stemming from conflicts of interests between agents and principals. More specifically, this article analyzes the costs stemming from
conflicts of interests;6 that is, the agent's willingness to take risky
projects vis-a-vis the principal's willingness to take this risk. In addition, this article suggests basic ingredients to be incorporated in the
7
compensation schemes in order to reduce the agency or social costs.
Section II briefly reviews existing compensation schemes and the
law in the executive compensation area. Section III presents a proposed compensation formula that minimizes social costs. In this model,
the agent's talent (i.e., government official or manager) is measured
by the probability of him making correct (i.e., value maximizing) investment decisions. The principal considers offering the agent a new
contract in each successive contract period, and uses the observed
annual cash flow from the firm's projects to estimate his talent. This

4. For more details on the various categories of possible "Agency Costs", see Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 1, at 308-310.
5. The model present in this paper also serves to address the issue of the reasonableness
of bonus or additional compensation. See Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp.
125 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
6. For possible conflicts of interest due to the separation of management and ownership of
the firm, see Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288 (1980) and Jensen & Meckling supra note 1, at 308-09.
7. Robert Haugen and Lemma Senbet's analysis of these agency costs suggest that instituting incentives may eliminate these costs. For more details, see Robert A. Haugen & Lemma
W. Senbet, Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital Through Options, 36 J. FIN.
629-47 (1981).
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article defines talent as the probability that the agent does not commit
errors in making investment decisions on behalf of the firm. If the

agent's talent falls short of a predetermined critical value, he is either
dismissed or his compensation is reduced. 9
In an efficient labor market, the reduction in the agent's compensation for poor performance is unavoidable.1° Once low cash flow is
observed, the owners of other firms which may hire the discharged
agent likewise estimate the agent's talent. It is not surprising, therefore, that most firms establish compensation schemes covering four
to five years.,, This permits the firm to review periodically the agent's
performance and either penalize him or pay him a bonus. 12 Two assessments of the agent's talent can occur in this model: First, the agent's
talent is low and the principal correctly infers it to be low. Second,
the agent's talent is high but the principal incorrectly determines that
his talent is low.
Section IV discusses the main results of the proposed model, section
V presents an example, and section VI provides a summary. Appendix
A provides an explanation of the mathematical and statistical terms
utilized in sections III, IV and V. Appendix B provides a mathematical
formulation of the model presented in Section IV.
II.

COMMON COMPENSATION SCHEMES AND REVIEW OF THE LAW
IN THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AREA

In 1980, 90% of the one-thousand largest manufacturing firms in
the United States used bonus plans to compensate their managers

8. The agent's decisions are protected by the business judgment rule unless their actions
result in waste of the corporate assets. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 1979 (7th Cir.).
9. There are many papers which deal with managerial compensation schemes. These studies
assume a one-period model, see MILTON HARRIS & ARTHUR RAViV, THEORY OF WAGE
DYNAMICS, (1982) and Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principaland Agent
Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979). Our paper, however, uses multi-period models with
a Bayesian approach to estimate the agent's talent. See infra note 28 for an explanation of a
Bayesian estimate. In questioning the reasonableness of compensation, "salary must bear a
reasonable relation to the officers ability and to the quantity and quality of the services he
renders." Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
10. For an analysis of the interaction between the market for managers and the compensation
scheme, see Fama, supra note 6, at 288-290.
11. See Jude Rich & John Larson, Why Some Long-Term Incentives Fail, 23 FIRST QUARTER COMPENSATION REV. 26-37 (1980).
12. Bonuses awarding an agent's performance must be reasonably related to the value of
the services rendered to the corporation. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp.
125 (D.C. Pa. 1943); Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933)(prohibiting payment of a bonus which
has no relation to the value of the services rendered by an executive).
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(i.e., chief executive officers). The median ratio of bonus to base salary
of the firms studied was 52%, demonstrating that the total compensation of many managers consists of two components: 1) a base salary
and 2) a bonus which is a function of the chief executive officer's
performance.' 3 If the bonus, for example, is tied to a target such as
earnings or earnings per share, then the precise amount of the bonus
is generally a percentage of the difference between the actual earnings
4
over a predetermined earnings target.'
In determining a chief executive's total compensation,' 5 an important element is the length of the executive's employment contract.
The most significant development in executive compensation in the
last fifty years has been the headlong rush of American companies to
institute long-term performance based incentive plans.16 Typically,
these plans establish earnings goals for the next four or five years
and the executive obtains the bonus if the predetermined goals are
achieved.' While few corporations employed such plans in 1970, today
more than 40% of the Fortune 500 companies employ a long-term
bonus contract with the bonus determined as a function of a performance index over four to five years.' Virtually all empirical studies on
executive contracts concentrate on the compensation paid when various

13.

For a discussion of compensation schemes of top executives, see 128 PUB. UTIL.

FORTNIGHTLY 3, Aug. 1, 1991, which reports the use of bonus based plans in the public utilities

industry increased from 25 to 65 % between 1983 and 1988.
14. For the formula suggesting the compensation scheme, see Paul Healey, The Effect of
Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 87 (1985). Using Healy's notation,
the bonus denoted B t is generally:
B t = Pt Max {(E t - Lt), 01
where Et is the reported earnings, Lt is the target earnings or the bound in which a bonus is
paid only if earnings are higher than this target, and Pt is some percentage figure. The empirical
evidence shows that the total compensation is given by W + B(X) where W is the base salary
and B(X) is the bonus which is a function of some random variable X (earnings).
15. The executive's salary must bear a reasonable relation to their ability and the quantity
and quality of services that the person renders. Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F.
Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). Compensation may be based on the corporation's profits. Id. See
also Moran v. Edison, 493 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1974); Erwin v. West End Dev. Co., 481 F.2d 34
(10th Cir. 1973).
16. Reasonableness of executive compensation should also take into account responsibilities
assumed, difficulties involved and success achieved. McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co.,
27 F. Supp. 639 (D.C. Md. 1939), affd, 112 F.2d 877, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940).
17. See Rich & Larson, supra note 11, at 26-37.
18. Id. at 26-37. The reasonableness of executive compensation can be determined by comparison to other officers in the same company or in other corporations in comparable fields.
McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639 (D.C. Md. 1959), affd, 112 F.2d 877,
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940).
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goals are achieved.19 However, the executive's penalty for not achieving the predetermined goals has not been studied. The study of poor
executive performance is important since the executive may either
incur a reduction in his base salary or be terminated when unacceptable
performance is recorded.
Unveiling the precise reason behind an executive's departure from
his job is not a simple task. Normally, the firm announces a "resignation" of the chief executive officer rather than a direct firing.2- Additionally, the precise reason for the firing is seldom provided, although
a careful analysis of developments in the firm, as well as the firm's
financial statements, may reveal "performance reasons" for the firing.
While an empirical analysis of the board of directors' decisions regarding this issue lies beyond the scope of this article, a few examples
reveal that poor performance several years in a row can lead to the
dismissal of the chief executive. 2 1 The next section presents a bonuspenalty scheme, determined in conjunction with the investment decisions made by the chief executive officer.
IIL

THE MODEL

The investment decision to be made by the chief executive officer
can be analyzed by dividing all potential projects available to the firm
into two mutually exclusive and comprehensive groups. The first
group, group A, consists of projects expected to increase the value
of the firm (profitable projects). The second group, group B, consists
of projects which are not expected to increase the value of the firm.
Determining the expected future value of a project requires forecasting
the future mean cash flows to be generated by the project. Recognizing
that money has time value, the expected future cash flows are discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate to determine
the present value of these cash flows.- The difference between the

19. See Healy, supra note 14, at 87-90. Examples of a wide array of compensation schemes
employed by various public utilities can be found in Special Feature 127 PuB. UTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY, No. 10, May 15, 1991. For example, New York State Electric & Gas compensates
senior executives for achieving predetermined targets in their business units. Wisconsin Power
& Light, Co. reports exploring employee incentive plans but hesitates due to concern that
employees will be over or under rewarded in the event of 'abnormalities.'
20. For the resignation of Aetna's chief executive officer, see WALL. ST. J., Aug. 31, 1984,
§ 3 co. 3, at 22.
21. Id.
22. The concept of present value is often employed in such claims as personal injury lawsuits
where the future value of a claimant's life-time earnings is determined today.
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present value of expected future cash flows of the project and its
initial cost is called expected net present value.- If the expected net
present value of a project is positive- then value is created since it
is expected to be a profitable project; if the expected net present
value is negative,2 value is not created since it is not expected to be
a profitable project.26
The cash flows expected to result from the project may, of course,
differ from the actual cash flows received for two main reasons: a)
the original estimate of the expected annual cash flows generated by
the project was correct, but a random deviation from the mean cash
flow occurred. In this case no errors were made by the executive in
his earlier investment decision; and b) the original forecast of the cash
flows was wrong. If an executive over-estimates the expected cash
flows, the project will be accepted since he believes it is a profitable
project when in fact it is not a profitable project. In addition, an
executive may reject a project which should have been accepted because he under-estimates the cash flows to be generated by the project.
In this case, he estimates that the expected net present value is
negative when actually it is positive. Therefore, the future value of
a firm depends on the talent of the executive and his ability to forecast
27
correctly the expected cash flows generated by the project.
For a given set of feasible projects, the talent of an executive is
defined as the probability of the agent not committing errors in forecasting a project's cash flows. The true talent of the manager is denoted
T. If the agent has perfect forecasting abilities (perfect talent) then
T = 1; and if he has no talent T = 0.s The talent of the agent can,
23. Expected net present value is denoted as E{NPV}.
24. Positive expected net present value is denoted as E{NPV} - 0.
25. Negative expected net present value is denoted as E{NPV} < 0.
26. For ease of exposition, if I denotes the project under consideration, NPV is the net
present value of the project, E(NPV) is the true expected net present value, and E in mathematical notation means "is an element of," then the projects in group A and B, respectively can
be summarized as
I E A if E(NPV) = 0
I F B if E(NPV) < 0
' is the maximum likelihood estimate of the agent's true talent T. For a discussion of
maximum likelihood estimators, see ALEXANDER MOOD & FRANKLIN A. GRAYBILL, INTRODUCTION TO THEORY OF STATISTICS 178-228 (2d ed. 1963).
27. Since it is assumed that no errors are made in estimating the risk of the project, the
only errors which occur involve estimating the mean cash flows generated by the project.
28. In statistics, this is a Bayesian estimate of talent, T. Bayesian estimation means that
we observe the agent's performance and from our observation we estimate his talent. It is like
estimating the probability of tossing a coin and observing heads. Our initial estimate would be
that the probability of observing heads is .5. However, after tossing the coin 10 times and
observing heads 8 times, our Bayesian estimate might be .7 (versus .5).
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therefore, be determined by considering the probability that he correctly accepts profitable projects, plus the probability that he correctly
rejects unprofitable projects.-s Rejecting projects which should be accepted and accepting projects which should be rejected thus reduces
the agent's estimated talent.
The principal (for example, the board of directors) who hires the
executive (agent) cannot, of course, directly observe the executive's
talent. The principal can, however, observe the actual cash flows generated by the firm (or, for example, the growth in earnings per share).
When the actual cash flows of the firm are below the expected cash
flows, the principal can either interpret this deviation as a random
deviation or as an error made by the agent (i.e., the agent has low
talent). Suppose that the agent's current employer as well as other
potential employers have some prior beliefs regarding the agent's talent. After observing the actual annual cash flow (observed performance), the principal formulates a distribution of beliefs regarding the
agent's talent.30 The principal will then estimate the mean value of
the agent's talent. 31 The principal does not wish to employ an agent
whose true talent is below some predetermined minimum level.2
Therefore, if the principal's estimate of the agent's talent is below the
predetermined tolerance limit, the agent is dismissed or faces a reduction in his base salary. 3
Since the principal is not certain as to the breakdown of the deviation of the observed cash flows from the expected cash flows into the
portion which is the random component and the portion which is agent's
error, like in hypothesis testing, the principal may commit the following two errors: 34

29. That is, the variable T (talent) is defined between zero and one as:
T = Pr(Accept I I I EA) + Pr(Reject I I I B)
Talent of the agent = Probability (Pr) of correctly accepting project I given I is an element
(E) of group A (increases firm value) + Probability of correctly rejecting project I given I is
an element of group B (does not increase firm value).
30. Statistically speaking, the prior distribution of beliefs is denoted f(T). Employing a
Bayesian approach (see supra note 28) the posterior density function is determined and denoted
g(TIX) where X is the observed cash flow.
31. The mean value of the agent's talent is denoted as T. T is the maximum likelihood of
T. For a discussion of the maximum likelihood estimators, see MOOD & GRAYBILL, supra note
26, at 178-87.
32. This minimum or critical value is denoted To.
33. Moreover, the future payment to the agent is monotonic (a strictly increasing function)
with the value of the agent's talent T. In the Bayesian framework, when the cash flow X falls
short of some critical value T., the estimate 't falls below the critical value T o.
34. For the procedure of hypothesis testing and the possible Type I and Type II errors,
see MOOD & GRAYBILL, supra note 26, at 179.
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1. The principal may dismiss the agent because the estimate of the agent's talent is below the tolerance limitwhen actually
the true talent of the agent is above the toler36
ance limit.
2. The principal continues employing the agent because
the estimate
of the agent's talent is above the tolerance
limit 37 when indeed the actual true talent of the agent is
below the tolerance limit.38
Each of these two errors is costly, and the principal will choose the
optimum tolerance limit by considering the magnitude of these two
costs. For example, the principal may choose the critical value such
that he minimizes the expected total costs. As in hypothesis testing,
the principal may reduce the total cost due to these two errors by
increasing the number of observations. 39 The number of observations
implies evaluating the agent's performance every few years. The optimum number of years between contracts in this respect is a function
of the various costs involved.
We do not analyze the costs induced by the various errors the
principal may commit in detail, but simply assume a contract is arranged for a given number of years40 with the executive's performance
being evaluated at the expiration of the contract. 41 In the model presented, it is possible that the executive faces a reduction in his compensation in the case of relatively low cash flows (poor performance),
even though the low cash flows may be due to random deviations from
the mean cash flow and are not induced by errors on his part. Similarly,
when a relatively high cash flow is observed, the principal pays the
executive a bonus and the base salary is increased in the next contract

cycle. 42
35. Denoted (t < T.).
36. Denoted (T > TO).
37. Denoted (T > T.).
38. Denoted (T < TO). An example of the concerns expressed by Wisconsin Power & Light
Co., supra note 19, provides a good example of these two errors.
39. Like in hypothesis testing, increasing the sample size (in our case number of years)
reduces both Type I and Type II errors. See MOOD & GRAYBILL, supra note 26, at 289.
40. Denoted k years.
41. See Rich & Larson, supra note 11, at 26-37.
42. For the behavior of the market wage for agents see Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstorm,
A Theory of Wage Dynamics, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 315, 317-19 (1982). N. P. Narayanan claims
that the managers have a strong incentive for short-term results (i.e., high cashflows in the
first few years even if these cashflows will drastically decrease in the future), which will increase
their bonus and even allow them to move to another job with a better contract, which is
consistent with our compensation model. For more details, see N. P. Narayanan, Managerial
Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1473 (1985).
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Other costs that may arise from the separation of ownership and
control are conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent.
These conflicts arise from many factors. 43 For example, a conflict may
occur where the principal and agent have different degrees of risk
aversion 44 (i.e., each is characterized by a different utility function).45
Even where both have the same preferences for risk, possible conflicts
of interest can arise if they possess different levels of initial wealth.
These possible differences do not induce a systematic deviation in the
agent's actions from those desired by the principal. The agent may
be more or less risk averse than some stockholders, but it would be
extremely unlikely that executives of all firms are systematically less
(or systematically more) risk averse than all other stockholders. The
fact that an agent and principal are characterized by different risk
preferences may lead to a random deviation of the agent's action from
the one desired by the principal, but it does not lead to any systematic
and predictable deviation.
The assumptions in our model neutralize this random deviation,
allowing us to concentrate on possible systematic deviations, and hence
potential social costs. We assume that the principal and the agent
choose their actions in an effort to maximize their expected utility46
of consumption. The concept of utility recognizes that it is the satisfaction or happiness we derive from money which is important and not
money itself.47 To avoid "random" conflicts of interests, assume that

43. For an analytical examination of this conflict, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at
305-10.
44. An investor is defined as risk averse if he is unwilling to invest in a risky asset whose
mean cash flow is equal to the price of the asset. For example, if a stock yields $100 with a
probability of 1/2and $120 with a probability of 1/2,a risk averter will not buy this stock as long
as its price is $110 (1/2$120 + V2 $100 = $110) or more. For this concept, see HAIM LEVY &
MARSHALL SARNAT,

PORTFOLIO AND

INVESTMENT SELECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE

197-201 (1984).
45. The utility function is defined as U(W + X) where W is the initial wealth and X is the
return on the risky asset. For more details on the role that the initial wealth plays in decision
making, see LEVY & SARNAT, supra note 44, at 157-162.
46. While the utility function reflects the investor's attitude toward risk, the ultimate goal
of every investor is to maximize expected utility. To be more specific suppose that one had to
choose between two random variables X and Y, then X would be preferred to Y if and only if
EU (W+X) > EU (W+Y)
When E stands for the expectation operator, W the initial wealth and X and Y the returns
on the two random variables. It can be proven mathematically that maximization of the expected
utility is the ultimate goal, regardless of the precise shape of the utility function U under certain
axioms. For the set of axioms and the mathematical proof, see LEVY & SARNAT, supra note
44, at 107-20 and App. 4.1, at 135-36.
47. Let U be the utility function (the preferences) of both the agent and the principal.
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both the agent and the principal have the same initial wealth,- and
hold the same number of shares in the firm. Therefore, they each
have the same stake in the firm. The agent earns a set wage each
year 9 for managerial services to the firm. The principal's income from
wages and other sources not related to the firm is also a predetermined
wage. Further, assume that the set wage is the income from a base
salary and from investing in the "market portfolio."0 In addition, the
following hold:
1. Each year's consumption 5' is equal to the agent's or
principal's available cash flow which is composed of both the
wage and investment income.
2. An additive utility function52 is assumed to enhance
simplicity when decisions are analyzed over multiple
periods.5
U(Co, C

The total utility
of consumption
for N periods

1

...CN)

N

U(Ct)

t=0

(1+ r)t

--

The sum (1) of the present values
of the utility of consumption in
each period (U(Ct)) discounted at
a risk free discount rate (r) for a
total of N periodsM

48. Initial wealth is denoted W o.
49. The annual wage is denoted W,.
50. The "market portfolio" is defined as a portfolio composed of all available risky assets,
where the market value of each asset divided by the total market value of all available assets
is the proportion of this asset in the portfolio. See LEVY & SARNAT, supra note 44, at 409, 416-20.
51. Each year's consumption is denoted Ct.
52. For a two-period model, an additive utility function isof the general form U(Cl, C2)
= U(C,) + alU(C 2 ) where a is a given positive constant and C, and C2 stand for the consumption
in periods 1 and 2, respectively. C, and C2 can also stand for two alternative commodities (rather
than consumption in two periods). See KENNETH JOSEPH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY
OF RISK-BEARING 54 (1971).
53. Jonathan Eaton and Harvey Rosen employ a non-additive utility function of the form
U(Cl, C2 , e) (where e is the manager's effort). However, they admit that in this general
framework the analysis of the firm-executive relationship is very complicated. An additive utility
function of the form U(CI, C2 ) = U(Cl) + a U(C 2) greatly simplifies the analysis. For more
details see Jonathan Eaton & Harvey Rosen, Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure
of Executive Renumeration, 38 J. FIN. 1489, 1490 (1983).
54. The risk-free rate of interest is the appropriate discount rate when the cashflows are
certain. However, in our case C, is not certain, but by calculating the expected utility (see eq.
(1) in section IV), the discounted term can be considered certain or the "certainty equivalent".
For the concept of a certainty equivalent see LEVY & SARNAT, supra note 44, at 157.
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We assume that the agent, as well as the principal, act
to maximize their multi-period expected utility given above.
3. The following multiperiod contract is analyzed:55The
agent has an employment contract for a given number of
years. He receives a base salary during these years and at
the end of the contract period his performance is evaluated
by the principal. A bonus may be paid at the end of the
contract, if his performance is good. The bonus in a given
year (if paid) and the base salary in the second contract
period are a function of the observed performance in the
first contract period. The bonus (if paid) in the second contract is a function of the performance during the second
contract period. Thus, every so many years a new contract
is signed or in the case of bad performance the executive is
fired.
4. There are many stockholders. If a bonus is paid to
the agent, its effect on each stockholder is negligible and
can be ignored. This assumption simplifies the analysis.
5. Returns are independent over time.56 Thus, the observed performance index (e.g., growth in earnings per
share, growth in the market value of stocks, etc.) for one
contract period is independent of the performance index in
a different contract period. This assumption is not crucial to
our analysis but simplifies the mathematical proofs.
Under these assumptions, the agent's decisions and the possible
existence of agency (or social) costs are analyzed. Various contracts
that the principal can employ to reduce the agency or social costs are
also analyzed in the next section.
IV.

THE RESULTS

Equipped with the model developed in section III above, alternative contracts can be formulated and possible conflicts of interest
analyzed. The mathematical notations used below are presented in
Appendix A. Suppose that the total planning horizon is N years. The
agent is considering executing an investment (project) whose initial
outlay is I. This new project is expected to generate a future net cash

55. A contract for a number of years rather than one year is very common. See Rich &
Larson, supra note 11, at 26-37.
56. If X, and X2 are two independent random variables then the expected value of the
product of two random variables is equal to the product of the expected value of each random
variable; that is, E(X 1 • X 2) = E(X1 ) E(X 2). This is not true if the random variables are not
independent. The empirical evidence taken from the stock market support the independence
assumption, see LEVY & SARNAT, supra note 44, at 667.
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flow (a random variable) in year t of Xt(I). The principal desires to
take this project if and only if the expected utility of the principal
from undertaking the project is greater than if it were not undertaken.
The proposed approach to identifying agency costs is as follows: to
determine the conditions under which the expected utility of undertaking a project differs between the principal and agent (that is, when
for a given project EpU(') $ EaU (.), where p stands for the principal
and a for the agent) in spite of the fact that both the principal and
the agent have the same utility function. Under these conditions,
conflicts of interest may arise.5 7 If these conflicts of interest are systematic and predictable, the firm can take action to eliminate them.
Using the notation developed in section III and Appendix A, the
principal would like the investment to be taken if the following holds:
(note that Xo, I, and Yt are scaled for the proportion of shares held
in the firm by the agent and the principal):
Equation (1)
N

EpU(.) = U(Wo + X o -I)

+

EU(Wt + Yt)

I
t=l

N

U(WO + Xo) +

I
t=1

>

(1

+

r)t

EU(Wt + Xt)

(1 + r)t

- M(-)

where EPU(.) stands for the expected utility of consumption of the
principal, Wo stands for the current wage income (from other sources
including holding of the "market portfolio"),58 Xo stands for the current
income received from the firm at time to, and Wt is the future principal's salary income (where t = 1,2 ... N). Should the project be taken,
the future income from the firm would consist of two components Xt
and Xt(I), where Xt is the future income from the firm when the
project is not taken, and Xt(I) represents the additional income due
to the new project whose initial cash, outflow is I. The total future
cash flow of the firm then c6nsists of the cash flow from existing
projects plus the cash flow from new projects and is denoted Yt. Yt
is therefore defined as Yt = Xt + Xt(I) (where = is the mathematical
symbol meaning "is defined as").

57. Although the principal and agent have the same utility function, their expected utility
may differ since they face different cash flows. This definition is in line with the graphical
analysis suggested by Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 316.
58. See supra note 50.
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For simplicity, we assume that without the bonus (or possible
penalty) the agent faces the same base income in each year Wt. Thus,
the agent's income in the first contract period is identical to the principal's income in the first contract period. However, at the end of the
first contract period when the agent's performance is evaluated, the
agent faces the following possible income depending on whether he
receives a bonus or not. T1 stands for the agent's performance in the
first contract period, D stands for "disaster" or the poor performance
target, S stands for "success," and B(T 1 ) is the bonus paid to the agent.
Equation (2)
Income in

the kth
year

" Wk

if T1 :< S

=

I

Wk + B(T 1 ) if T 1 >

S

If D -< T1 -< S, no bonus or penalty action is taken and this is
considered normal or standard performance. 59 Moreover, the principal
would consider this standard and acceptable performance and hence
renew the agent's contract by repeating the terms of the previous
contract. If the agent's performance is greater than the performance
target,60 the agent is considered successful; that is, he achieved more
than the target and he is paid a bonus for performance in the first
contract period. 61 In this case, the principal will offer the agent a new
contract with an increase in base salary. If an increase in his salary
is not offered, the agent will move to another firm which will make
him this offer.62 This will occur since other firms also observe his
performance and similarly estimate his talent. After receiving the
bonus at the end of the first contract period, the agent faces another
contract for the next contract period and he tries to achieve the target
set for him in the next contract period. (This target, of course, may
be changed from one contract to another.)
Note that the executive's total compensation is a function of both
a base salary as well as a bonus.- The base salary does not remain
59. Using Healy's terminology, the realized earnings by the manager E t are lower than
the target earning Lt, see Healy, supra note 14, at 87-88.
60. Denoted T, > S.
61. As an example of such compensation policy, Healy quotes the compensation scheme
employed by Standard Oil Company of California: "The annual fund from which an award may
be made is two percent of the amount by which the company's annual income for the award
year exceeds six percent of its annual capital investment for such year," see Healy, supra note
14, at 87.
62. This is in line with the suggestion of Fama who advocated an efficient labor market
for managers (or agents), see Fama, supra note 6, at 292-98.
63. The bonus is denoted as B(T).
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constant but is also a function of the agent's performance. In the event
of successful performance, the increase in the agent's base salary can
be viewed as a function of his performance.- Likewise, when the
agent's performance is below some target level,65 the agent's base
salary assigned in the next contract will be reduced.6 The penalty for
poor performance results in a reduction in the base salary when a
new contract is signed, or the firing of the agent by the firm. If the
agent is fired, the penalty is measured by the difference between the
67
agent's current income and the income he obtains from his new job.
The principal analyzes performance after the second contract period
for the agent's effectiveness during those years. If successful performance is observed, a bonus is paid in at the end of the second contract
period.6 Our analysis considers two consecutive contracts 69 or an 8-10
year period. 70 With the above framework established, we now turn to
determining the specific conditions under which the expected utility
of undertaking a project differs between the principal and agent and
the agency costs which may arise.
Recall that the principal and agent have the same risk preferences
or utility function. Assume that the agent is considering a new invest71
ment whose economic life is the length of two consecutive contracts.
For simplicity assume that without the new project the agent's performance is standard with certainty.72 Thus, we can analyze the marginal effect of the new project on the agent's decision. With the above
assumptions, the agent's expected utility if the new project is not

64. Denoted 'I(T 1 ).
65. The target level is denoted D. Recall that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the observed cash flow and the estimated talent of the agent t. Therefore, while the principal
can base his decision on the estimated value of the agent's talent T , the contract is normally
set in terms of observed performance such as growth in earnings, observed cashflows, etc.
66. This reduction is assumed to be according to the function denoted 4'(T,).
67. Recall that all employers use the same approach to estimate the agent's talent, and a
lower base income will be offered to the agent by the new employer in a case of observed bad
performance.
68. T2 denotes the talent index in the second period.
69. Denoted as N = 2k years.
70. The extension to more than two contract cycles is similar. However, due to discounting
the value of the years beyond 8-10 years is less significant. The further in the future that the
cash flow is obtained, the smaller its contribution to the net present value, hence the smaller
its effect on the decision making process. For an elaboration of this notion, see LEVY & SARNAT,
supra note 44, at 35.
71. The entire analysis holds for a project with a life less than N years or for N > 2k
years (a case where we need -to consider more than two contract cycles).
72. This means D - T, -5S with probability equal to one.
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taken is exactly equal to the principal's expected utility (see the value
M on the right-hand side of equation (1) above). However, if the
73
project is taken, the principal's expected utility is given by EPU(-),
(which is the left-hand side of the equation (1) for the specific case where
there are two consecutive contracts),
Equation (3)
U(Wo+Yo-I)

EUP(.)

+

k-1
Y

EU(Wt+Yt)

t=l

The total expected
utility of the
principal

= Current utility
of total net
income

2k
+

(1+r)t

+ The present value of
the expected utility
of total income in the
first contract period

EU(Wt+Y

tk

t)

(I+r)'

+ The present value of
the expected utility of
total income in the
second contract period

Similarly, the agent's expected utility for two contract periods, which
incorporates the bonus and/or penalty (which we denote as terms A,
B and C), is given by EUa(), 7 4
Equation (4)
EUa(.)
The total
expected
utility of
the agent

= U(Wo+Y-I)
= Current utility
of total income

+

k-1
I
t=1

EU(Wt+Yt)
(t+r)t

+ The present value of
+ The
the expected utility
present
of total income from
value of
base salary in first
the
contract, year 1 to k-1
expected
utility
from
income
including
bonus or
penalty
in last
year of
the first
contract,
year k

The
present
value of
the
expected
utility
from
income
during
the
second
contract
period
years
k+1 to
2k-1

The
present
value of
the
expected
utility of
income
including
any
bonus or
penalty
in the
final
year,
year 2k

To analyze potential conflicts of interest between the agent and
the principal with this commonly employed compensation scheme, we
calculate the difference in the expected utility of the principal and the
agent in the case where the project is executed. The difference in the
73. This is due to the fact that an additive utility function is assumed.
74. Since the agent's performance is evaluated only at year k, up to year k-1 neither a
bonus or a penalty is involved. Indeed terms A, B and C of equation (4) below incorporate a
possible bonus or penalty.
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expected utilities is the difference between equations (3) and (4)
above 7 5 which we denote A.
Equation (5)
A

=- EUp(-)

The expected utility
of the principal
minus the expected
utility of the agent

-

EUa(*)

Equation 3

-

Equation 4

Note that up to the year before the first contract ends and the bonus
or penalty is determined, all terms are identical and hence the first
two terms in equation (3) cancel with the first two terms in equation
(4), leaving the last term in equation 3 and the last three terms in
equation (4).
Equation (6)
2k EU(Wt + Yt)
2k
W+

t=k
The difference in
the expected utility
of the principal and
agent

-

(A+B+C)

(1+r)t
The present value
of the expected
utility of the
principal in the
second contract
period

-

The present value
of the expected
utility of the agent
in year k (term A),
years k+ 1 to 2k-1
(term B), and year
2k (term C),
respectively

Recall that the principal evaluates the performance of the agent and
either pays him a bonus or imposes a penalty at the end of the first
contract and at the end of the second contract. Denote by A1 thc
expected utility difference between the principal and agent corresponding to the last year of the first contract, A2 is the difference corresponding to the period when the base salary is determined by the success
or failure of the agent in the first contract period (years k + 1 . . .
2k-i), and A3 is the difference due to the last year of the second
contract. The total difference is, of course, the sum of these three,
or A = A1 + A2 + A3. In Appendix B we derive each Ai (i=1,2,3)
75. If A > 0 this means that the principal derives a greater expected utility than the agent.
Thus, it may be that the agent rejects a project desired by the principal a possible conflicts of
interest arise, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 308-09, 316-19.
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and use the derivation to analyze the sign of A under various scenarios.
A reflects the conflicts of interest arising over the entire contract
period. While in general the difference between the expected utility
of the principal and agent as well as the bonus and penalty cannot be
predicted in advance, conclusions can be drawn by analyzing several
possible bonus-penalty schemes.76
First, let us analyze the case where a bonus and an increase in
wages are not awarded in the event of success, but a penalty is imposed
in the event of failure. Ignoring nonpecuniary income, this scenario
may be appropriate for government officials, such as, the financial
manager of the foreign exchange reserves of a given country. These
government officials may lose their jobs in the case of failure but get
no bonus in the case of success. Note that the same results hold even
when a bonus is paid but it is small relative to the penalty involved.
Let us analyze possible social costs for various cases.
Case 1: In this case no bonus is paid in the first period or in the
second period and no increase in the base wage occurs.7 7 In this case,
the difference in the expected utility of the principal and agent in the
first contract year is equal to zero but is positive in each successive
period. Since the expected utility of the principal is greater than the
expected utility of the agent, agency costs may exist and profitable
projects may be rejected by the agent. The explanation of this result
is obvious: if a risky but profitable project is considered, its acceptance
may follow a penalty but no bonus, hence this asymmetry in the cash
flows from the agent's point of view results in its rejection. That is,
the higher the variability of the project's cash flows, the higher penalty
in the base wage 78 and therefore the greater the difference in utility. 79
Thus, agency costs s° would be relatively large in firms which face
relatively risky projects and are run by a government official. For
projects with a relatively small amount of risk, for example public
utilities, agency costs would be smaller or even completely nonexistent.

76. That is A i 0 and the sign depends on the functions 1P, 4P, and g(T). For the definition
of A, see App. B of this paper.
77. That is, 'I(T 1 ) = B(T 1) = B(T 2) = 0 and it is easy to show (due to monotonicity) that
A1 = 0, A2 > 0 and A3 > 0 hence A > 0. Namely, no bonus or wage increase takes place, see
Appendix B of this paper. Monotonicity asserts that for any two levels of wealth W1, W 2, if
W, > W 2 then also U(W 1) > U(W 2) must hold where U is the utility function. See, LEVY &
SARNAT, supra note 44, at 119.
78. Denoted by (D(T1 ).
79. Utility is denoted A in equation (6).
80. If the principal prefers that the project be taken but the agent rejects it, the value of
the firm is lower than what it could be. This reduction is the value of the firm is called agency
costs, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 308, 316-19.
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Case 2: Most prior literature dealing with the agent-principal relationship assumes a one-period model; hence, a base wage and a bonus
are incorporated into the analysis, but a penalty is not considered. 81
This analytical shortfall emphasizes the need to analyze the agent-principal relationship in a multi-period framework where a penalty is
explicitly considered. Nevertheless, in the multi-period framework,
the no-penalty assumption can easily be incorporated by setting the
penalty reduction in the base wage8 2 equal to zero, and the bonus paid
in both the first and second period being non-negative as well as the
change in the base wage if a bonus is paid being non-negative.- This
scenario may occur when the agent has a life-time or very long contract
with a given base salary (hence he cannot be fired) and with a bonus
attached to it. In this case the expected utility of the agent is greater
than or equal to the expected utility of the principal in every one of
the three sub-periods analyzed. This is true in the last year of the
first contract year since the bonus in the first contract period is nonnegative. In the second period, since the base wage in the second
contract is also a function of success in the first period and hence may
increase. Finally, at the end of the second contract, a bonus may be
paid which causes a difference in the expected utility. 8
Once again, the higher the variability of the project's cash flows,
the more negative the total expected utility difference. In other words,
the expected utility of the agent is greater than the expected utility
of the principal. In this case, risky projects with negative net present
values may be accepted and agency costs incurred. This distortion in
decision-making where the agent is made better off at the expense of
the principal being worse off (lower expected utility) may explain why
companies avoid life-time or very long-term contracts. 5
Although case 1 and 2 above represent extreme compensation
schemes, they are not symmetric in the agency costs they induce. In
case 1, the agent may reject projects with positive net present value,
hence the firm's profit would be low relative to the other firms in the
same industry. At the termination of the contract, the principal can
dismiss the agent who shows relatively low observed performance. In

81. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling supra note 1, at 314-16; Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing
and Incentives in the Principaland Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 57, 57-9 (1979).
82. Denoted cI)(TI).
83. I.e., 1(T 1), B(TI) and B(T) all being non-negative.
84. See equation (A-7) in Appendix B for this specific condition.
85. Most companies offer a contract for several years rather than one year, see Rich &
Larson, supra note 11.
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case 2, the agency costs are induced by two sources. First, projects
with negative net present value are taken (direct agency costs) which
may push the firm into the red. Second, since no penalty exists, the
manager may be characterized by a relative low talent (i.e., low probability of making correct investment decisions), hence he induces additional "indirect" agency costs by making many wrong decisions. Since
by assumption the firm cannot impose a penalty by dismissing this
agent, the damage to the firm (and hence society) persists during the
agent's life-time. Thus, a compensation scheme with no bonus is not
as harmful as a compensation scheme with no penalty (i.e., a life-time
contract).
Case 3: The conclusions of case 1 and 2 above are preference-free.
We can refine the analysis further if we assume risk-aversion. 6 First,
we will assume that a long-term bonus does not exist, but a reduction
or an increase in the base salary may occur when a new contract is
signed.87 The possible increase or reduction in future wages are symmetric functions with the probability of a reduction or an increase in
the base salary equally likely. 8 In this case, the expected utility of
the principal is equal to the expected utility of the agent in the last
year of the first contract (year k).- This occurs because, by assumption, the bonus is zero.- However, the principal's expected utility
during the second contract is greater than the agent's expected utility,
due to risk aversion and the symmetry of the increase and reduction
in the agent's base salary.91
Since risk aversion plays an important role in determining the sign
of A2 as well as the sign of A 3 , an elaboration on this claim is useful.
If the utility function is linear (i.e., the principal and agent are riskneutral) then each unit increase in wealth results in a unit increase
in utility. This one-for-one relationship is true for every level of wealth.

86. When the second derivative of the utility function is negative (U" < 0), we assert that
risk aversion prevails. See LEVy & SARNAT, supra note 44, at 123 n.26.
87. That is, we assume B(T1) = B(T 2 ) = 0 (no long-term bonus is paid) and D(TI) > 0 and
P (TI) > 0.
88. A restatement of this condition in terms of our mathematical notation is d)(T 1 ) = IP(T1 )
and g(T 1) are symmetric density functions with Pr(T<D) = Pr(T>S).
89. That is A, = 0 in the kth year.
90. However, when B(T,) =0 equation A-4 in Appendix B becomes A= f f 0 f(T 1 , Yk)
S dTldYk = 0.
91. See Appendix B for a presentation of risk aversion and symmetric density functions.
D

A2 > 0 since we assume risk aversion and g(T1) is symmetric with
c)(TI) = 41(T 1).

C

f g(T1)dT, = f g(TI)dT 1 and
S
-C
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However, if the utility function is non-linear, and assuming risk aversion, then the utility function is concave. Thus, the utility of wealth
increases at a decreasing rate (i.e., the first derivative of the utility
function is positive (U'>0), but the second derivative is negative
(U"<O)). The implication of a concave utility function is that utility
increases with increasing wealth, but it increases at decreasing rate.
Because of this implication, along with the assumption that the probability function is assumed to be symmetric, the utility gain of the
agent is smaller than his utility loss and hence A2 > 0 and A3 > 0.9
Thus, the principal's expected utility is greater than the agent's expected utility for the entire two contract periods. Therefore, the agent
may reject projects with positive expected net present values and in
case of compensation scheme with no bonus component, potential social 93 costs exist. This is consistent with Dent's statement that "[m]anagers may shun risks attractive to shareholders and pursue steady,
albeit modest, returns that will assure steady compensation."- Note
that any payment to the manager implies a reduction in cash flow to
the principal and any penalty implies an increase in the cash flow to
the principal. However, since there are many owners (stockholders),
the fraction of the increase or the reduction in the agents base salary
is small and hence when the number of stockholders is large this figure
95
can be ignored.

92. See the utility terms in the bracket of equation (A-5) in Appendix B for the special
case where (D(T
1 ) = P(T 1 ) is denoted V. The difference in the expected utility of the principal
and agent in years k + 1 to 2k-1 (i.e., A2 ) when the increase and reduction in the base salary
is symmetric reduces to [U(Wt + Yt) - U(wt + Yt - V)] - [U(w t + Yt + V) - U(w t + Yt)].
If utility is linear, these two terms cancel and A2 = 0. However, since we assume risk aversion,
it implies that which means that for the same increase in wealth the corresponding increment
in utility is diminishing as the initial wealth of the individual is higher. Since Wt + Yt + V >
wt + Yt the utility gain due to the first term above is greater than the utility loss due to the
second term. Since the probability function g(T1 ) is assumed to be symmetric (equal probability
for a bonus or penalty) A2 > 0. Looking at the difference in expected utility in year 2k (that
is, the sign of A), we must compare pairs of terms (A + B > 0, see equation (A-6) in the
Appendix C). This stems exactly as in the explanation for the difference in expected utility for
years k+ 1 to 2k-i, A2 , from the assumptions of risk aversion and symmetric bonus-penalty
functions. The term D = 0 (see eq. (A-7)) since by assumption B(T2) = 0. Terms C + E > 0,
since by assumption B(T 2) = 0, 1D(Tl) = A(T1 ), g(Tl) is symmetric and risk aversion is assumed.
93. Social costs and agency costs are identically defined in this article; namely, the decline
in the market value of the firm due to non-optimal decision making, for example, rejecting a
project with a positive net present value.
94. See Dent, supra note 3, at 886.
95. That is, 1(T 1 )/n or IP(T1 )/n where n is the number of stockholders. For firms where n
is very large, the last few terms can be ignored.
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One way to decrease the agency or social costs arising from the
above case is to set the values of a disaster and success (i.e., D and
S, respectively) in such a way that the probability that the agent's
talent is low is less than the estimate of the probability that his talent
is high (i.e., Pr(T < D) < Pr(T > S)). Namely, the probability of a
disaster is smaller than the probability of a success. In this case the
probability of penalty is smaller than the probability that a bonus will
be paid which in turn increases the expected utility of the agent.
Increasing the expected utility of the agent reduces the difference in
the expected utility of the principal and the agent, and A decreases
(see equation 5 above). Thus by decreasing D and increasing S, A
decreases.
In general, where there is no long term bonus or penalty, social
costs exist. It is not surprising, therefore, that 40% of the Fortune
500 companies have adopted long-term compensation schemes.- Relaxing the analysis above to include a long-term bonus or penalty, it is
not possible to unambiguosly determine the existence of social costs.
The degree of social or agency costs depends on the relative magnitudes of the difference in the expected utility of the principal and
agent during the three periods analyzed (i.e., A1 versus A 2 versus
A3). 97 Nevertheless, we can unambiguously determine that without a
long-term bonus, the expected utility of the principal is greater than
the expected utility of the agent (A ;- 0) and social costs exist. With
a long-term bonus scheme A - 0, but the magnitude of the difference
in the expected utility of the principal and agent decreases in comparison to the no-bonus case since A1 decreases, A2 remains unchanged
and A3 decreases [See equation (A-7) in Appendix B]. Thus, the social
costs decrease as long as the bonus is not "too large" relative to the
other wage components. However, the social costs may, at some point,
even increase due to large bonuses. To be more specific, while without
a bonus or penalty, projects with positive expected net present values
may be rejected, with a bonus scheme this tendency decreases.

96.
97.
B(T 1 )

See Rich & Larson, supra note 11.
In the case of asymmetry in the bonus-penalty scheme with P(Ti) = c(T 1) R: 0,
0 and B(T 2 ) > 0, we have A, < 0 (since B(T 1 ) > 0 hence U(Wk + Yk) - U(Wk +
Yk + B(T 1)) in equation A4 in Appendix B is less than zero), A2 > 0 since T(T) = F(T 1 ) and
U is concave. The explanation of risk aversion in determining that A2 > 0 is exactly as before
when B(T 1) = 0. With respect to A3 , the sign is ambiguous since as before due to the assumption
of risk aversion A + B > 0, D < 0 (since B(T 2 ) ->0). Recall that if B(T 1 ) = 0, C + E > 0
as explained before. However, with B(T1 ) > 0 the negative term E (see equation A-7 in App.
B) becomes even smaller and therefore C + E may even become negative. Therefore C + E
0.
0 depending on the relationship between B(T 2 ) and 4(T 1), and hence A
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Moreover, the agent may even accept undesirable projects (i.e., those
with negative net present values) if the bonus or penalty is large,
which again induces social costs. The optimum bonus should be such
that the expected utility of the principal is exactly equal to the expected utility of the agent, i.e., A is exactly equal to zero.98 A company
can create this equality by changing the bonus function or by changing
the length of the agent's contract. Recall, however, that due to the
discounting process (i.e., present values), the greater the number of
years of the contract, the less important the bonus relative to the
other components of the multi-period utility function. Figure 1 describes the agency costs as a function of the bonus B(T). When the
bonus scheme is optimal, (i.e., B(T) = B*(T)) agency costs are zero
(since A = 0).
A common feature of all of the compensation schemes discussed
above is that when the risk profile of the firm is very small, there is
little chance that the actual cash flow falls outside the range of disaster
or success and agency costs are unlikely to exist.9 For these low risk

98. If A = 0, the expected utility of the principal and the agent are identical, hence no
conflicts of interest arise and no agency costs exist.
99. This characterizes firms with stable sales and stable cash flows, e.g., electric companies.
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firms, the need for a large bonus to eliminate agency costs is not
necessary. However, for firms where the cash flows are characterized
by a large variance, a large component of the agent's compensation
should be in the form of a long-term bonus.
Another crucial factor in the compensation scheme is the duration
of the contract. The less that is known about the agent's true talent,
the shorter the length of the optimal contract since this strategy allows
the principal to dismiss the agent should cash flows be relatively low.
However, a contract for a very short period of time may induce a
relatively large estimation error. That is, the observed performance
index (or the Bayesian estimate of the agent's talent) may be subject
to a wide margin of error. If the length is too short, the principal
may dismiss a talented agent, or give an untalented agent a bonus.
Thus, there is a need for a number of observations (years) before an
evaluation of the agent's performance can be determined with a reasonable margin of error. As in hypothesis testing, the firm should find
the optimum contract duration which balances the cost of having an
untalented agent who continues making errors in the investment decision-making process and the cost of dismissing a talented agent.i°0
Both direct and indirect agency costs arise in the above analysis.
For example, if an agent has a lifetime contract with a fixed wage
and no bonus or penalty (Case 1), he may serve the firm to the best
of his ability such that direct agency costs are not incurred. However,
suppose that the principal discovers that the agent has very low talent
(using the previous terminology the agent's true talent T is less than
the predetermined critical value To). In this case, the firm suffers
from many errors in the investment decision-making process and indi-

100. Social costs are defined in this paper exactly as agency costs; namely, the decline in
the market value of the firm due to non-optimal decision making, e.g., rejecting a project with
a positive net present value (NPV - 0). For example, suppose that the firm chooses the optimum
contract duration of k years which minimizes the expected costs. In evaluating the agent every
k years, the firm faces the following cost function,
C = akC1 + PkC2 + Ck

when ak is the probability of committing a type I error; that is, the firm dismisses the agent
when his true talent is relatively high (T > To), and Pk is a type II error, where the principal
continues to employ the agent when his true talent is relatively low (T < To). C 1 is the present
value of the costs involved with replacing the agent, C2 is the present value of losses induced
by the agent during the period of the second contract, and Ck are the present values of losses
due to errors made during the years of the first contract. By reducing k (the number of years
for each contract), Ck is reduced (since the firm can dismiss the agent relatively early) but like
in hypothesis testing osk and Ok increase. Thus, the firm has to find the optimum contract
duration which minimizes this function.
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rect social or agency costs are induced. Since the agent cannot be
dismissed, the loss can be quite large from errors made during his
life-time employment.
Finally, in a compensation scheme where only a bonus is paid when
the observed performance during a given number of years passes some
critical value,101 two additional biases, neither of which were considered
above, can occur. For example, suppose that at the end of the second
contract, the agent's talent is very close to the predetermined critical
value. In the kth year the agent may benefit from taking a very risky
project even if it is not expected to be profitable. In the case of
success, he would get a bonus; in the case of failure (unless it is an
extreme failure) he would not be penalized since it is at the end of
the contract cycle. This approach also induces social costs. This behavior questions the earlier assumption of independence of the income
cash flows.- ° To avoid these social costs and the income dependency
over time, the firm may establish a bonus-penalty function such that
when the agent's performance equals an index denoted T* (for example
the industry average), neither a bonus nor a penalty occurs. For
performance which is different from T* a bonus in relation to the
difference in the size of the bonus B(T - T*) is paid. (Similarly, the
penalty would be a function of the distance 1D(T* - T)). Under this
modified bonus-penalty scheme, the agent has no incentive to accept
a risky but profitable project even if his performance is close but less
than the value T* since T may diminish and his bonus in the kth year
may be reduced. The results of this paper remain intact when a continuous bonus-penalty function is incorporated into the analysis.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Assuming either risk neutrality3 or alternatively risk aversion,
the economic literature of the agent-principal issue investigates oneperiod contract schemes which constitute an optimal solution.- This
article analyzes various commonly used incentive schemes in a multiperiod context. The talent of the agent is measured by the probability

101. See Healy, supra note 12, at 87-88.
102. This occurs since a set of values Y .. Yk-1, which happen to induce a performance
index which is close to the threshold value, determines the distribution of Yk by the agent's
project selection.
103. This implies a linear utility function, or U with U'=0. See LEVY & SARNAT, Supra
note 44, at 129.
104. Harris & Raviv, supra note 8, at 23.
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of him not making errors in the investment decision-making process.
The agent may commit errors in his investment decision-making and
the principal may commit errors in estimating the agent's true talent.
This article analyzes these two types of errors.
When the principal bases the agent's compensation on a base wage
only, which is predetermined for a relatively long period of time, even
if the agent makes every effort to reach an optimal investment decision
(from the principal's and hence society's point of view), his talent may
be limited and indirect agency costs incurred. It is not surprising,
therefore, that most firms report using compensation schemes covering
only 4-5 years. 10 5 The need for evaluating the agent's performance
every few years and not every year is due to minimizing the statistical
errors the firm may commit in estimating the agent's talent.
Since utility is maximized with increases in wealth, risky projects
which are not expected to increase the value of the firm may be
executed when compensation consists of a base salary plus a wage
increase and a bonus (which is paid every k years). When the agent's
compensation alternatively consists of a base salary and a penalty,
such as being fired, risky projects that are expected to increase the
value of the firm may be rejected. While the latter compensation
scheme is not common in the business community, it does characterize
the employment contracts of government officials (e.g., managers of
the cash reserves of the central bank of various countries). When a
symmetric increase or decrease in the base salary (with no bonus) is
possible, a risk-averse agent would tend to reject risky projects with
a positive expected net present value and social costs arise.
Supportive evidence that this type of conflict between the principal
and the agent takes place can be found in a comprehensive survey
conducted by Blume, Friend and Westerfield. - That study found that
even though the industry cost of capital was 12.4%, managers on
average set a cut off rate well above 12.4%. Therefore, projects that
would earn the required rate of return would be rejected.
This article demonstrates that a symmetric increase or decrease
in the agent's base salary is not sufficient to avoid agency or social
costs. To avoid social costs the firm should institute an asymmetric
compensation scheme such that the bonus income exactly offsets the
penalty of income loss in utility terms. For example, a firm can add
a bonus every k years which is a function of the observed performance

105. See Rich & Larson, supra note 10, at 23.
106. See Marshall E. Blume, Irwin Friend & Randolph Westerfield, Impediments to Capital
Formation, RODNEY L. WHITE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL RESEARCH 25 (1980).
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during the k years. Under such a structure, conflicts of interest can
be completely eliminated.
Agency or social costs can be reduced by various means. However,
the optimum combination of compensation scheme ingredients are yet
to be investigated. For example, it is not clear whether a large bonus
every ten years is better from the firm's point of view than a smaller
bonus every five years. Or, should the firm skip the bonus altogether
and establish a larger increase in the base salary? An alternative way
to reduce agency costs is to keep the change in the base salary symmetric, but reduce the critical value for successful performance. In
finding the optimum combination, a firm must consider both direct
and indirect social costs induced by possible errors in estimating the
agent's talent.
One alternative to reduce conflicts of interest is to structure the
bonus paid to the agent as a fraction of the market value of the firm.
By rejecting a risky but profitable project, the manager reduces his
potential bonus. He thus has an incentive to avoid rejecting risky but
profitable projects. However, this will not completely eliminate the
social costs since accepting a risky project may lead to the agent's
dismissal because of a possible sequence of low cash flows. In terms
of utility, acceptance of a risky project may hurt the agent more than
would benefit him due to the extra bonus. In this case, he would still
reject the risky but profitable project.
Thus, when managers hold a relatively larger proportion of their
wealth in the firm, it may decrease the agency costs but not completely
eliminate them. Indeed Lewellen 107 finds that stock ownership by the
senior executives of large, publicly-held corporations constitutes a significant proportion of their reward. It seems that many firms employ
this compensation structure to reduce potential agency costs. In summary, there is no one operational way which completely eliminates
potential agency or social costs but there are several ways, as
suggested in this paper, to reduce them.

107. See Wibur G. Lewellen, Management and Ownership of the Large Firm, 24 J. FIN.
299, 312-13 (1969).
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APPENDIX

A

I. The following terms are introduced in section III and used
throughout the remainder of the paper:
Group A: Projects which are considered to be profitable and therefore expected to increase total firm value.
Group B: Projects which are not considered to be profitable and
therefore not expected to increase total firm value.
E(NPV) The expected net present value of a project where the
net present value is the difference between the present value of the
expected future cash flows emanating from the project and the initial
cost of a project.
T Denotes the true talent of the agent (manager) in making correct investment decisions.
t The principal's best estimate of the agent's true talent.
To A predetermined target of the agent's talent determined by
the principal from which the agent's observed talent will be measured.
X Observed cash flows of the firm.
k The number of years within which the agent's talent will be
determined; i.e., the length of the contract.
U General notation for the utility curve of both the agent and
principal. A utility curve is simply a way of describing an individuals
preferences for uncertain consumption.
t The specific year being considered.
Ct General notation for consumption in each period t. For example, Co is consumption today, C1 is consumption next year, C2 is
consumption in the second year, and so on.
N The number of consumption periods or total number of years
considered (called the planning horizon).
r Denotes the risk-free rate of interest per period (per year in
this case).
I Denotes the initial cost of the project (the investment).
Pr Denotes probability.
E Mathematical notation which means "is an element of a set".
I The mathematical notation which means sum (or addition) of a
series of numbers.
E The statistical notation for expected value (i.e., expected value
operator).
f Integral which means "find the cumulative value under some
given curve."
A The total difference in the expected utility of the principal and
the agent.
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A1 The difference in the expected utility of the principal and agent
in the last year of the first contract (when the bonus or penalty for
performance in years 1 to k-1 is determined).
A2 The difference in the expected utility of the principal and agent
during the second contract period (years k + 1 to 2k-i).
A 3 The difference in the expected utility of the principal and agent
when the second bonus or penalty is determined (year 2k).
II. The following new terms are defined in section IV.
Xt(I) The future net cash flow (X) in the specific year (t) generated
from a new project (I). Xt(I) is a random variable.
a Abbreviation for the agent.
p Abbreviation for the principal.
EpU(.) Denotes the expected utility of the principal.
EUa(-) Denotes the expected utility of the agent.
Wt Base income in each year t which is the same for the principal
and the agent.
Wo Defines the total current income (both from wages and other
sources) of both the principal and the agent.
Xt The income generated by the firm's existing projects. Thus
Xo is the income generated by the firm at to, where to is today (the
present), t, is the next period, etc.
Yt The total cash flow expected from both the firms existing
projects (Xt) and the new project if it is undertaken (Xt (I)). Therefore,
Yt -- Xt + Xt (I).
Wk The income of the principal in the kth year.
T1 The observed performance index during the first contract
period (which is the first k years).
B(T 1) The bonus paid to the agent at the end of the 1st contract.
B(T)
Is a general notation for the bonus.
S Denotes success (i.e., good investment decisions were made).
D Denotes disaster (i.e., bad investment decisions were made).
l (T1 ) Function which measures the increase in the agent's base
salary as a function of his performance.
'1(T 1 ) The function which defines how the agent's salary is reduced if his actual performance is below a predetermined target.

OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

APPENDIX

B

In this Appendix, we analyze the terms A, B and C of equation
(4) in section IV, and the conditions under which the terms of equation
(5) are either positive, negative or ambiguous.
Term A is given by,
A

=

(1+r)- k

S

0000

f

f U(Wk+Yk)f(Tl, Yk)dTldYk +

f

f U(Wk+Yk+B(T))f(T1, Yk)dTldYk

-

S

-W

-0

0

(which is failure in the first period)

(which is success in the first period)

(A-1)
where f(T1 , Yk) stands for the joint density function of T1 and Yk
which are, of course, dependent (recall that T1 is the performance
index of the previous k years, including the kth year whose income is
Yk). Namely, if T1 - S no bonus is paid while if T1 > S a bonus,
B(T 1 ) is paid, which is a function of T 1. The larger the observed
performance measure, T 1, the larger the bonus paid when the first
contract is terminated. The term B is given by,
2k-1
0
1
(1+r)-t [ f f(Yt) {
-0
t=k+l
(which is failure in

B

D

f g(T1)U(Wt+Yt-4)(T))dT,
-0

the first period)

(A-2)
S

+

f

g(T1)U(Wt+Yt)dT1 +

D

(which is standard
performance in the
first period)

f g(T 1)U(Wt+Yt+P(T

1))dT1}dYt]

S

(which is success
in the first period)

Note that years k + 1 up to year 2k correspond to the new (second)
contract. If in the first cycle T1 < D (hence the integral is - to D)

the new base salary is reduced by (I(T 1 ). If T1 > S (hence the integral
is from S to -), the agent was successful in the first period, hence in
the new contract, the base salary increases by T(T1). In the case of
the standard performance D --T1 - S (hence the integral is from D
to S), the base salary is unchanged.
The function g(T1) and f(Yt) are the density functions of T1 and
Yt, respectively. Here it is reasonable to assume that Yt (corresponding to years k + 1, ... , 2k-i) is independent of T1 . However, existing

dependency, like in term A above, would not change the results (see
the analysis of term A below).
The term C corresponding to year 2k (the last year of the second
contract) is more complicated since it incorporates the possible changes
in the base salary (a function of the performance in the first period
(T1 ) and a possible bonus in case that the agent is successful in the
second period, namely that the performance index T2 is greater than
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S). Thus, we have to consider all combinations of the three ranges of
T1 and T 2 which determine the bonus in year 2k. Consequently, C
has six terms and is given by,
D

0'

f g(T1 )

f f

C -= (I+r)-2k{

S

g(T 2, Y2k)U(W2k+Y

2k-4(T))dTdT 2dY 2 k

(which is failure in the first period and no success in the second period)
S

'0 S

+ f g(T1 ) f

f g(T 2, Y 2 k)U(W 2 k + Y2k)dTldT2 dT2 k

.M -0c

D

(which is standard performance in the first period and no success in the second period)
S

f

+

f f

g(T1 )

g(T2, Ylk)U(W2k+Y

2kP(Tl))dTdTudY 2k

"00

-

S

(which is success in the first period and no success in the second period)
0

D

+

f

g(T1 )

-:

f

f

-0

S

g(T2 , Y2k)U(W 2k+Y2k-4(T) + B(T 2)dT~dT 2dY2k

(which is failure in the first period and success in the second period)
0

S

+

f

D

g(T1 )

f

f

-=

S

g(T2 , Y2k)U(Wlk+Y2k+B(T2)) dTldT2dY 2k

(which is standard performance in the first period and success in the second period)
+ f g(T1 ) f f g(T2 , Y2k)U(W 2k+Y 2k(T)+B(T2))dTldT 2dY 2 j
S
S
(which is success in both the first period and the second period.)

(A-3)
If A = 0 no social costs are incurred. Denote by Ai (i=1,2,3) the
expected utility difference corresponding to the kth year, k + 1 up to
2k-1 years, and 2 kth year respectively. Hence A of equation (5) is A
- A1 + A2 + A3.
Ignoring the discount factor (which is common in both terms) we
have,
A1 = f U(Wk+Yk)f(Yk)dYk-A

Since the first term is independent of T 1, adding the integral over T,
does not change the results since it is like multiplying the first term
+1, A1 can be rewritten as
00

A1 =

f
-

00

f U(Wk+Yk)f(T,

Yk)dTldYk-A

-W

Substituting for A (see equation (A-i)), yields, where the first term
is the expected utility of the principal in the kth year and the second
term is the expected utility of the agent from the income in this year
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Al =

f

f

S

-0

{U(Wk+Yk)-U(Wk+Yk+B(T)} f(T 1, Yk)dTldYk

(A-4)

(which is success in the first period)

since the integral over the range (-x, S) cancels out. (Therefore the
first term of A, see equation (A-i), vanishes and the integral of the
first term of A, is from S to - rather than - to so). Let us turn to
the term A2. (Once again, ignore the common discount factor.)
2k-i
A2

2k-1

I

EU(Wt+Yt)-B

t=k+l
S

D

I
t=k+l

f f(Yt)( f g(T,)U(Wt+Yt)dT,+

f g(T1 )U(Wt+Yt)dT1

-

D

-

+ f g(T1 )U(Wt + Yt)dT 1)dY t - B
S

Thus, we multiply EU(Wt + Yt) by f g(T1 )dT 1 = 1 and break the last
integral into three integration intervals (namely,
W

D

f g(T1 )B(T1 )=

f g(T1 )B(T 1 ) + f g(T1)B(Tj) + f g(T 1 )B(T)).

-W

S

-W

00

D

S

Plugging in the three terms corresponding to B, the integral over in
range (D,S) cancels out, and what is left is,
2k-i

A2

-

D
f f(Yt){ f g(T1)[U(Wt+Yt)-U(Wt+Yt-(D(T1)]dTI
-0
t=k+l (which is failure in the first period)

(A-5)
- f g(T,)[U(Wt+Yt+4'4(T

)-U(Wt+Y,)] dT1 }dYt

1

S

(which is success in the first period)

Note that the first term corresponds to failure of the manager in the
first period while the second term corresponds to success during this
period. In the case of standard performance in the first period D :5
T, :- S, no increase or decrease in the agent's wage takes place. The
analysis of A 3 is more complicated since it includes more terms. First
rewrite EU(W2k + Y2k) as,
DS

EU(W2k+Y)

- (1+r)-2k{

f g(T 1) f
-( i

i f l

f g(T2, Y2k)U(W 2 k+Y 2 k)dTldT2dY 2k
-ro

(which is failure in the first period and no success in the second period)
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o0 S

f

g(T1 )

f f

g(T2, Y2 k)U(W 2k+Y

2k)dTldT 2dY2k

-X

D

(which is standard performance in the first period and no success in the second period)

+

00o

0

f

f

g(T,)

S

f

g(T 2, Y2k)U(W 2k+Y 2 k)dTldT 2dY 2k

-. ..0

S

(which is success in the first period and no success in the second period)
o

D

+ f g(T1 )

f

f g(T2, Y2 k)U(W 2 k+Y2k)dTldT 2dY2k
S

(which is failure in the first period and success in the second period)
S

+

f

g(T1 )

D

cc

W

f

f

-o

S

g(T2 , Y2k)U(W 2 k+Y

2k)dTldT2dY 2k

(which is standard performance in the first period and success in the second period)
+

f

g(T1 )

S

f

f

-X

S

g(T2, Y2k)U(W 2k+Y 2k)dTldT 2dY 2k

(A-6)

(which is success in both periods.)

Note that to achieve this result we simply multiply EU(Wk

+

Yk)

00

by f g(T1 )dT 1 = 1 and as before we break the integral into three ranges
(-, D), (D,S), and (S,oo). Also we integrate the joint density function
g(T 2 , Y2k) over the whole range of T2 and since T2 does not appear in
the utility we simply obtain the marginal density function g(Y2k). (Recall from statistics that by definition f g(T2 , Y 2 k)dT 2 dY 2 k

=

g(Y 2 k).) los

We decompose the left term of equation (A-6) into six terms which

are parallel in the integration ranges to the six terms given in equation
(A-3). Hence, an analysis of A3 is possible. In calculating A3 (ignoring
the discount factor), the integral over one range D1 : T, !5 S, - <
T2

S cancels out and the following terms are left,

:

D

Xc

A3 = f g(T1 ) f

S

f

-

g(T 2, Y2k)[U(W 2 k+Y 2 k) -U(W 2k+Y

2k-41(T1)]dTldT 2 dY 2k

(A)

(which is failure in the first period and standard performance in the second period)
-

m

f
s

wc S

g(T1 )

f f
-C

g(T 2 , Y2 k)[U(W2k+Y 2k+4P(T1)) -U(W 2k+Y 2k)]dTldT2dY 2k
(B)

--

(which is success in the first period and no success in the second period)

108.

See MOOD &

GRAYBILL,

supra note 26, at 91 equation 4.
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00

D

00

f g(T 2, Y 2k)[U(W 2 k+Y 2k) -U(W

+ f g(T 1) f
-

s

-

2k+Y2k-(D(Tl+)B(T2)]dTldT 2 dY 2k

(which is failure in the first period and no success in the second period)

00

S

+ f g(T,)
D

f
-o

(C)

(A-7)

-

f g(T 2, Y 2k)[U(W 2k+Y 2k) -U(W2k+Y

2k+B(T2))]dTdT 2dY2

k
(D)

S

(which is failure in the first period and success in the second period)
-

f g(T1) f

f g(T2 , Y2k)[U(W 2k+Yuk+,P(TI)+B(T 2)) -U(W2k+Y

S

S

-

2k)]dTdT2dY 2k

(E)

(which is success in the first period and success in the second period)

In calculating A1, A2, A3 we deal with the most general case when
the penalty and the bonus exist. However, by inserting B(T 1 ) = B(T 2 )
= 0 we can analyze a compensation scheme with no bonuses. By
inserting P(T 1 ) = 0, we have the formula for a compensation scheme
with no increase in wages in the second cycle, and finally by inserting
(D(Tl) = 0, we have a compensation scheme with no penalty.

